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Resumen: Examinamos cómo el contraste 
que establece Frege entre los juicios de identidad 
de las formas “a=a” versus “a=b” podría 
ir en el caso especial en el cual ‘a’ y ‘b’ 
son representaciones mentales complejas, y ‘a’ 
está por un introspectivo pensamiento del yo. 
Argumentamos primeramente que el tratamiento 
fregeano de los pensamientos del yo implica que 
estos son los que denominamos “pensamientos 
de un disparo”, a saber: pensamientos que 
solamente pueden ser pensados una vez. 
Esto tiene la sorprendente consecuencia de 
que ninguna instancia de la forma “a=a” 
de juicio, en este caso específico, resulta 
verdadera, muchos menos a priori verdadera. 
Lo anterior refuerza las objeciones de Glezakos 
contra la construcción del puzzle de Frege, 
y simultáneamente suscita lo que pensamos 
que es un agudo problema para los fregeanos, 
en la medida en que el pensamiento del yo (y 
más generalmente, el pensamiento indéxico), 
entendido a su manera, se vuelve incompatible 
con algunos rasgos básicos de la racionalidad.
Palabras claves: Pensamientos del yo. 
Reflexividad del ejemplar. Pensamientos de un 
disparo. Paradoja. Racionalidad.
Abstract: We examine how Frege’s contrast 
between identity judgments of the forms “a=a” 
vs. “a=b” would fare in the special case where 
‘a’ and ‘b’ are complex mental representations, 
and ‘a’ stands for an introspected ‘I’-thought. 
We first argue that the Fregean treatment of 
I-thoughts entails that they are what we call 
“one-shot thoughts”: they can only be thought 
once. This has the surprising consequence that 
no instance of the “a=a” form of judgment in 
this specific case comes out true, let alone a 
priori true. This further reinforces Glezakos’s 
objections against the set-up of Frege’s puzzle, 
while also raising what we think is an acute 
problem for Fregeans, insofar as I-thought (and 
indexical thinking more generally), understood in 
their way, turns out to be incompatible with some 
basic features of rationality.
Key words: I-thoughts. Token-reflexivity. 
One-shot thoughts. Paradox. Rationality.
0. Introduction
Frege presents us with a puzzle arising 
when we compare true identity sentences of 
two forms: “a=a” vs. “a=b”; e. g. “Hesperus is 
Hesperus” vs. “Hesperus is Phosphorus”. Both 
types of sentences are made true by the self-
identity of the same object. Yet, while sentences 
of the first kind, according to Frege, are trivial, 
hence known a priori to be true, sentences of 
the second kind are often informative and their 
truth is not in general known a priori. Frege 
accounts for this epistemic contrast by proposing 
that the meaning of sentences is not exhausted by 
their reference, but also involves a sense, i. e. a 
specific mode of presentation, or concept, of the 
reference. Glezakos challenges the legitimacy of 
this argument for the role of senses. She argues 
that the initial puzzle can only be generated 
if we presuppose all along the very notion of 
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sense that it purports to justify; and that the 
alleged epistemic divide between “a=a” and 
“a=b” evaporates as soon as we try to formulate 
it in theory-neutral terms.
Our approach in this essay is broadly 
sympathetic to Glezakos. Our goal is to show that 
the consideration of a particular case of identity 
judgements involving indexical thoughts, further 
strenghtens Glezakos’s attack against Frege’s 
epistemic claims, while also raising additional 
problems for the Fregean.
We examine the contrastive pair of identity 
statements, “a=a” vs. “a=b”, in the special case 
where ‘a’ and ‘b’ are themselves complete 
sentences,1 and ‘a’ stands for an introspected 
I-thought.2 We argue that the Fregean treatment 
of I-thoughts entails the surprising consequence 
that no instance of “a=a” in this specific case 
comes out a priori true, because none of the 
instances are true. This further reinforces 
Glezakos’s point, while also raising what we 
think is an acute problem for Fregeans, insofar as 
indexical thinking understood in their way turns 
out to be incompatible with some basic features 
of rationality.
1. ‘I’-thoughts
Frege holds that the content of sentences (and 
of content-bearing representations more generally, 
including mental states), or the proposition they 
convey, is not individuated in terms of their 
reference, but in terms of their sense, which is the 
thought they express. Thoughts are themselves 
composed of senses, or concepts. Sense is 
individuated by cognitive significance:
Cognitive significance
Iff two thoughts T
1
 and T
2
 are different (i. e. 
contain different senses) then it is possible for a 
rational subject to think one without thinking the 
other (under the same attitude).3
(Where ‘thinking’ stands for any manner of 
apprehending a proposition, whether by believing 
it, rejecting it, doubting it, etc.)
‘I’-thoughts are those thoughts which 
contain the sense of ‘I’, or ‘I’-concept. A subject 
who entertains such a thought thinks about 
herself, but, more importantly, thinks of herself 
as herself. It is not just that she thinks of a 
person who so happens to be identical with 
herself, as someone who entered a lottery might 
think of the winner without yet realising that 
they themselves are the happy fellow. Rather, 
she thinks of her own person in a way that 
makes it impossible for her not to realise that the 
object of her thought is herself.
2. ‘I’-thoughts as essentially private 
thoughts
Frege claims that a subject’s ‘I’-thoughts can 
only be thought by her; as we shall say, they are 
‘essentially private’. All our thoughts are ‘private’ 
in the mundane sense that they are represented in 
the medium of mental events happening in our 
own minds. When we entertain a thought, this is 
not a public event, and it is up to us whether or 
not we choose to communicate it. But for Frege, 
‘I’-thoughts are essentially private, in the sense 
that we couldn’t communicate them at all, even 
if we wanted to. The content of the mental event, 
and not just its occurrence in her psychological 
life, is in this case accessible to the subject alone. 
This is because the sense of ‘I’ under which a 
subject thinks of herself as herself can only be 
grasped by her. To understand Frege’s position, 
we must quote him at length:
Now everyone is presented to himself in a 
particular and primitive way, in which he 
is presented to no-one else. So, when Dr. 
Lauben thinks that he has been wounded, he 
will probably take as a basis this primitive 
way in which he is presented to himself. And 
only Dr. Lauben himself can grasp thoughts 
determined in this way. But now he may 
want to communicate with others. He cannot 
communicate a thought which he alone can 
grasp. Therefore, if he now says “I have been 
wounded”, he must use the “I” in a sense 
which can be grasped by others, perhaps in 
the sense of “he who is speaking to you at 
this moment”, by doing which he makes the 
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associated conditions of his utterance serve 
for the expression of his thought (Frege, 
1879/1956, 298).
The above passage clearly states Frege’s 
commitment to the essential privacy thesis.4 
Many neo-Fregeans, following Frege, either 
explicitly acknowledge or indirectly imply that 
‘I’-thoughts cannot be shared (see for instance 
(Evans, 1985), (Chalmers, 2011)).
There has been ample debate about whether 
essentially private thoughts are acceptable5 and 
whether Fregeans can dispense with them (Cf. 
(Bermúdez, 2005), (Recanati, 2012, ch. VIII), 
(Morgan, 2009, 76-85)). In what follows, we 
argue that ‘I’-thoughts pose a problem for 
Fregeans which has been overlooked in this 
debate. To that effect, we first argue that Frege is 
not only committed to the view that ‘I’-thoughts 
are essentially private, in the sense that they 
are contents which cannot be shared, but also 
to the view that they are essentially actual and 
essentially present as well. Such thoughts could 
not be thought by anyone else, or at any other 
time, or in any other world. They could not be 
thought in more than just one instance. We go 
on to argue that the existence of such ‘one-shot 
thoughts’ is, however, unacceptable for Frege, 
because it is inconsistent with the constraint of 
Cognitive Significance stated above.
3. Why are ‘I’-thoughts essentially 
private?
What are Frege’s reasons for claiming 
that ‘I’-thoughts, unlike the content of the 
‘I’-sentences that we communicate instead for 
want of a direct expression of these thoughts, are 
essentially private? The quote above, as well the 
passage immediately following it, contain hints 
from which we can derive a plausible motivation 
for this view.
According to Frege, thinking an ‘I’-thought to 
the effect that I have been wounded disposes me 
to utter the ‘I’-sentence “I have been wounded”. 
However, the content of the original mental event 
is not identical to the content of the subsequent 
utterance (although there presumably exists a 
regular connection between the two). This is 
because the sense of ‘I’ in the mind differs from 
the sense of the word ‘I’ in speech.6 The paragraph 
quoted above gives an insight into Frege’s view as 
to what the linguistic sense of ‘I’ may be:
Therefore, if [Lauben] now says “I have been 
wounded”, he must use the “I” in a sense 
which can be grasped by others, perhaps in 
the sense of “he who is speaking to you at 
this moment”, by doing which he makes the 
associated conditions of his utterance serve 
for the expression of his thought (Frege, 
1879/1956, 298).
In insisting on the special role of the 
utterance in communications involving ‘I’, 
Frege appears to hold what can be seen as a 
precursor to “token-reflexive” theories7 of the 
sense of indexicals. Indexicals are the expressions 
which, like ‘I’, determine their reference, on each 
occasion of utterance, by exploiting contextual 
facts about this very utterance. To rephrase 
Frege somewhat, whenever an utterance x of 
the word ‘I’ is produced, the sense conveyed 
is roughly “The speaker of this token x of ‘I’”. 
In this description, the value of x is supplied 
in context, as the very utterance which also 
expresses the sense. More generally, the sense of 
indexicals is captured by descriptions of a special 
kind, which make reference to the utterances 
(tokens) of the expressions themselves (hence 
their characterisation as “token-reflexives”).
As Frege holds a token-reflexive view of 
the sense of the word ‘I’, it is reasonable to 
assume that he takes the sense of ‘I’ in thought 
to have a similar structure. If an occurrence of 
‘I’ in speech refers to whoever uttered this very 
occurrence, it is plausible that an occurrence of 
‘I’ in the mind refers to whoever thought this very 
occurrence. And it is, indeed, a constitutive rule 
about ‘I’-thoughts that they are always about the 
subject who thinks them.
There is, however, a crucial difference between 
the linguistic and mental cases. The sense of 
the word ‘I’ determines its referent, for each of 
its occurrences, to be the producer of this very 
linguistic occurrence, which is a publicly observable 
item. By contrast, the sense of ‘I’ in thought 
ALEXANDRE BILLON AND MARIE GUILLOT100
Rev. Filosofía Univ. Costa Rica, 53 (136 Extraordinary), 97-105, May-August 2014 / ISSN: 0034-8252
determines its referent, for each of its occurrences, 
to be the producer of this very mental occurrence, 
which is present only in the subject’s mind.
Immediately after the passage about the 
essential privacy of ‘I’-thoughts, quoted above, 
Frege defends at great length the claim that 
mental events (or, in his own terminology, ‘ideas’) 
are exclusively accessible to their subjects:
Ideas are had. One has sensations, feelings, 
moods, inclinations, wishes. An idea which 
someone has belongs to the content of his 
consciousness. [...] [F]or it is impossible to 
compare my sense-impression with that of 
someone else. For that it would be necessary 
to bring together in one consciousness 
a sense-impression, belonging to one 
consciousness, with a sense-impression 
belonging to another consciousness. [...] No 
other person has my idea [...]. No other 
person has my pain. Someone can have 
sympathy for me but still my pain always 
belongs to me and his sympathy to him. He 
does not have my pain and I do not have 
his sympathy. [...] [E]very idea has only 
one bearer; no two men have the same idea 
(Ibidem).
Now, if we put together a token-reflexive 
view about the sense of ‘I’ in thought, which it is 
reasonable to ascribe to Frege, and his thesis of 
exclusive access to mental events, what we obtain 
is precisely the consequence that ‘I’-thoughts are 
essentially private contents. Let us suppose that 
the sense of ‘I’ is something like “the thinker of 
this very mental occurrence o of ‘I’”, or S(o) for 
short, and the value of o, for each instanciation 
of the concept, is supplied by this very mental 
occurrence. As the token-reflexive description 
S(o) is couched in terms of a mental token 
which the subject alone can access, she is also 
alone in being able to grasp the full description. 
‘I’-thoughts, as a result, are contents that can only 
be thought by one person.
4. One-shot thoughts
Whether the essential privacy thesis is 
sustainable has been, as noted above, the object of 
intense discussions. However, what concerns us 
here is a more radical thesis, which we also take 
Frege to be committed to. Taken together, the 
putative token-reflexivity of the sense of ‘I’ and 
the claim that mental contents are individuated by 
senses (instead of being individuated, say, by the 
objects being referred to) entail that ‘I’-thoughts 
can only ever be thought, not just by one person 
but in one single instance. They are what we shall 
call “one-shot thoughts”.
The argument, in intuitive terms, is this. If to 
think that I’m happy is to think that the subject of 
this very mental event is happy, then this can be 
thought but just once. Another attempt at thinking 
this thought would generate a new mental event, 
whose content would now be that the subject of 
this very mental event – not the subject of the 
previous one – is happy.
Let us gloss this a little. The thought crosses 
my mind that I am happy. Given token-reflexivity, 
the mental occurrence o
1
 of my thinking that 
I’m happy has the sense that the thinker of this 
very mental event, o
1
, is happy. As the mental 
occurrence itself, as a spatio-temporal particular, 
contributes to individuating the sense it conveys, 
this sense can be instanciated just once. If I tried 
to think it a second time, this would take the form 
of a second mental event, o
2
. But while the sense 
of o
2
 could very well contain a reference to o
1
, 
this reference could not be token-reflexive. One 
of two things would have to be the case:8
(i) Either s[o
2
] = the thinker of o
1
 is happy;9 
(ii) Or, s[o
2
] = the thinker of o
2
 is happy.
If (i) is the correct paraphrase of the sense of 
o
2
, then this sense contains a reference to o
1
, as 
o
1
 itself does, but it doesn’t contain the sense of 
‘I’, because it is not token-reflexive, as shown by 
the fact that the values of o on either side of the 
equality sign are different. So o
2
 does not express 
an ‘I’-thought, and its sense cannot for this reason 
be identical to the sense of o
1
.
If, on the other hand, (ii) captures the sense 
of o
2
, then this sense is token-reflexive, so 
that o
2
 expresses a genuine I-thought. But this 
I-thought is distinct from that expressed by o
1
, 
since the latter is individuated in terms of the 
mental occurrence o
1
, not in terms of the mental 
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occurrence o
2
. So the sense of o
2 
is, again, 
different from that of o
1
.
However we try to reproduce it, the fully 
specified sense of o
1
 remains unamenable to a 
second instanciation, for the combined reasons 
that its full specification is done in terms of 
its own occurrence as a mental event; and that 
mental events happen but once.
This consequence might perhaps not be of 
too much moment for a theorist who, while taking 
the sense of ‘I’ to be token-reflexive, does not 
individuate the content of a representation in 
terms of its sense –but rather, say, in terms of 
what it refers to. This is close to the position of 
such neo-Russellians as Perry and Kaplan. In 
the Afterword to his (1977),10 Perry explicitly 
endorses the existence of senses, including 
indexical senses, while denying that they are 
constituent parts of the propositions expressed or 
entertained when we speak or think. But Frege, 
as noted at the beginning of Section 1, takes the 
content of a sentence or mental state to be the 
thought it expresses, hence to be individuated 
by the senses which this thought contains. As 
the sense of ‘I’, on each of its instanciations, is 
specified afresh via the associated token-reflexive 
condition, I-thoughts contain a component that 
cannot be duplicated; and thus the content of any 
mental state that prompts me to use the word ‘I’ 
can never be thought more than once. ‘I’-thoughts, 
as we propose to say, are ‘one-shot thoughts’.11 
5. The problem of one-shot thoughts
5.1 One-shot thoughts and identity judgments
If Fregean ‘I’-thoughts are one-shot 
thoughts, a surprising consequence is that we 
can never judge truly something like: “My 
thought that I am happy is the same as my 
thought that I am happy” (in so far as such a 
judgment seeks to identify the content of two 
distinct mental events occurring successively). 
This judgment intuitively seems true, and indeed 
trivially so. However, Fregeans are committed to 
denying this; indeed, they are committed to the 
claim that a subject introspecting any two of her 
‘I’-thoughts will never be in a position to judge 
them truly to be identical.
Let us unpack this a little. Let ‘a’ be the 
expression I give mentally to an ‘I’-thought (say the 
thought that I’m happy) when I pause to consider 
it introspectively. As we have seen, because this 
thought contains the sense of ‘I’ and this sense 
is specified in a token-reflexive manner, it is a 
one-shot thought. Consequently, no other thought 
is identical to it. But it seems possible for me to 
reflect on my thoughts, including my ‘I’-thoughts, 
so far as to wonder whether they are the same, or 
different. I can judge, for instance (Case 1), that 
my thought that San José is the capital of Costa 
Rica, entertained at time t
1
, is the same as my 
thought that San José is the capital of Costa Rica, 
entertained at time t
2
; while (Case 2) my thought 
that San José is the capital of France differs from 
it. Consider now the case of ‘I’-thoughts. I think 
at time t
3
 that I’m happy, and again think, at time 
t
4
, that I’m happy. It seems intuitively true that, 
were I to introspect those two mental states, I 
should find myself to be in something like Case 
1; in other words, I should judge “a=a”. But as 
the mental states I have at t
3
 and t
4
, according 
to the Fregean, express one-shot thoughts, this 
judgment would in her light never be true.
Thus, we have here a specification of the 
schema “a=a”, where ‘a’ is the expression we give 
to an ‘I’-thought when we reflect introspectively 
on it, in which it proves impossible to find a true 
instantiation of the schema; let alone one that is 
a priori true.
Note that if ‘a’ is just any name for an 
‘I’-thought, there is an escape from this perplexing 
consequence. Given one of my ‘I’-thoughts, nothing 
stops me from giving it a name and then re-using 
the name to refer back to the ‘I’-thought as often 
as I please. What I can’t do, however, is to have 
the same ‘I’-thought twice. So the schema “a=a” 
becomes impossible to instanciate so as to be true 
in the specific case where ‘a’ is the vehicle of my 
mental state when I think of my ‘I’-thought in the 
way that I do when I introspect it; that is, when I 
take it as my object at the same time as having it.
Our result reinforces, and in a way 
radicalizes, Glezakos’s point. Judgments of the 
contrastive forms “a=a” and “a=b”, where ‘a’ 
expresses an introspected ‘I’-thought and ‘a’ and 
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‘b’ are coextensive, present no difference as to 
their epistemic profiles. In neither case are they 
ever true:
 (i) Suppose I judge “a=a”, e. g. that my 
thought that I’m happy is identical to my 
thought that I’m happy. This cannot be 
true since the thought expressed in each 
occurrence is one-shot.
 (ii) Now suppose that I, NN, judge “a=b”, e. 
g. that my thought that I’m happy is identical 
to my thought that NN is happy. This is 
false, as witnessed by the fact that I could 
think the former without thinking the latter 
(and vice-versa), a case made familiar by the 
scenarios set up by Perry (1979) to evidence 
the essential indexicality of the first kind of 
thought.
Operating with Fregean notions, and 
considering the special case where we introspect 
‘I’-thoughts, we thus arrive at the conclusion 
that there is no difference in epistemic status 
between the two forms “a=a” and “a=b”, which 
was Glezakos’s point; but in addition, we obtain 
a counter-intuitive truth-assessment as regards (i).
5.2 One-shot thoughts and rationality
The Fregean treatment of ‘I’-thought also 
raises a more general and, we believe, serious 
problem in connection with rationality.
It seems that if a thought is to play a rational 
role, it must be capable of being displayed in 
simple inferences such as a modus ponens. Now 
it is dubious that a thought can ever play that 
role if it can only be thought once. If the thought 
expressed by ‘p’ is one-shot, then I will be unable 
to think that p, and then that p implies q, and to 
conclude q. This suggests that if ‘I’-thoughts are 
to play any rational role at all, they cannot be, 
as the Fregean treatment implies they should be, 
one-shot thoughts.
One-shot thoughts also pose a more 
immediate issue of theoretical coherence for 
Frege. The claim that ‘I’-thoughts are one-shot is 
indeed inconsistent with the Fregean constraint 
on thoughts which specifies their rational role, 
i. e. the constraint we have called “Cognitive 
Significance” (iff two thoughts are different 
then it is possible for a rational subject to think 
one without thinking the other under the same 
attitude). To see that, suppose that I am thinking12 
simultaneously two distinct one-shot thoughts x 
and y. By Cognitive Significance, it is possible for 
a rational subject to think x without y or y without 
x. By symmetry, we can suppose, without any 
loss of generality, that the first case obtains, and 
that it is possible to think x without y. So there is 
a possible subject S, in a possible world w, and a 
time t, such that in w, at t, S thinks x without y and 
is rational. Given that x is one-shot (it can only 
be thought once) and that I am actually thinking 
x right now, however, S must be me, w must be 
the actual world and t must be now. As S at (w, 
t) thinks x but not y, this implies, in turn that I 
am thinking x but not y. This, however, is absurd, 
for I am, by hypothesis, thinking y. This implies, 
by reductio, that it is impossible for me to think 
two distinct one-shot thoughts.13 I can however 
think two distinct ‘I’-thoughts at the very same 
time. I can for example think, at the very same 
time, that I feel like drinking beers and that I 
feel like eating snails; yet these two thoughts are 
distinct. The Fregean commitment to the claim 
that ‘I’-thoughts are one-shot is accordingly 
problematic, in so far as it leads to paradoxical 
consequences.
6. Rationality and objectivity
A mental event such as my thinking that I 
feel like eating snails is a Janus-like, two-faced 
particular. It has, on the one hand, some rational 
properties which are tied to the way it can be 
used in inferences, rational properties which the 
Fregean notion of (expressed) thought registers. 
It also has a-rational, empirical properties, tied 
to the subject, the world and the time at which 
it occurs, and to other aspects of its vehicle. 
Interestingly, one-shot thoughts are thoughts 
that can only be the content of one particular 
thought-vehicle. This means that the occurrence 
of the thought-vehicle thanks to which a given 
one-shot thought is entertained and the fact that 
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this thought is entertained at all are necessarily 
equivalent. In that sense, we might say that 
one-shot thoughts short-circuit the distinction 
between the rational field of thought and the 
a-rational field of thought vehicles. The rational 
features of one-shot thoughts are, so to speak, 
fused with their a-rational features. It is easy 
enough to suspect that this short-circuit might 
threaten the very rationality of the former.
This suggests a tentative diagnosis of the 
problem of one-shot thought presented above. 
The reason why Fregean thoughts should not 
be one-shot, is that they are defined by their 
rational features (this constitutive link is spelled 
out by Cognitive Significance). They cannot 
have such rational features, however, unless they 
are sufficiently distinct or “distant” from their 
a-rational vehicle, which is not the case when they 
are one-shot.
More than objectivity as usually conceived, 
it is this distinction or “distance requirement” 
that Fregean thoughts must meet if they are to be 
recognisable as thoughts at all. It is a requirement, 
however, that ‘I’-thoughts could not meet on the 
Fregean construal.
Nor are the paradoxical results observed in 
connection with ‘I’-thoughts confined to just one 
isolated type of case. If ‘I’-thoughts (and indexical 
thoughts more generally) are indeed a-rational 
thoughts, this has far-ranging consequences. 
For instance, it seems reasonable to suppose 
that, whenever we reflect instrospectively on our 
own thoughts, our doing so involves forming 
‘I’-thoughts. When I deliberately reflect on the 
thought, which just crossed my mind, that today 
is a beautiful day, what I do is to self-ascribe this 
initial thought; this presumably takes the form of 
a new and more complex, ‘metarepresentational’ 
thought which is something like “I think that 
today is a beautiful day”. To say that ‘I’-thoughts 
are a-rational might thus be tantamount to saying 
that all introspection lies outside the realm of 
rationality. This, however, is hardly a sustainable 
conclusion if epistemologists such as Shoemaker 
(1994), Gallois (1996) and Burge (1996) are right 
that introspection is a requirement on rationality. 
Exploring this and other indirect implications 
of our observation, however, would exceed the 
limits of the present essay. Suffice it for now to 
note that the case of ‘I’-thoughts, considered in 
its own right, not only further bolsters Glezakos’s 
case against Frege’s puzzle, but throws the notion 
of sense into a crisis in more ways than have been 
so far fully acknowledged.
Notes
1. Or whatever complex representation is used 
as a vehicle to reflect on one’s ‘I’-thoughts 
in introspection. Talk of sentences here is a 
mere convenience; we do not wish to commit to 
any particular language-of-thought hypothesis. 
The only similarities that we’ll assume 
between mental representations and sentences 
are captured by the following two hypotheses: 
(i) when we introspectively examine our own 
thoughts, this introspective thinking is realised 
by some representational vehicle or other; and 
(ii) such representations are capable of multiple 
instantiations.
2. Our argument generalises to all indexical thoughts 
(e. g. now-thoughts, here-thoughts, actually-
thoughts), but for brevity’s sake we’ll present it 
with examples involving the concept “I”.
3. This is a reformulation of Evans’ “Intuitive 
Criterion of Difference” (Evans, 1982, 18), 
which recaptures Frege’s criterion for sameness 
and difference between thoughts (and senses 
generally) in terms of sameness and difference 
in cognitive significance. Beyond their role 
as what accounts for differences in cognitive 
significance, Frege thinks that senses also have 
two further functions; namely, to act as “modes 
of presentation” of a referent, and to determine 
the truth-value of the representations expressing 
them. Some, most notably Perry (1979) and 
Kaplan (1989), doubt whether the same entity can 
in fact assume all three roles. However, as Frege 
believes this is indeed the case, we can ignore this 
debate here.
4. But see (May, 2006, 503).
5. Or indeed, whether this is a cogent notion at all. 
Frege’s notion of thought is meant to capture 
precisely what, in cognition, is shareable between 
different subjects: “By a thought I understand not 
the subjective performance of thinking but its 
objective content, which is capable of being the 
common property of several thinkers” (Frege, 
1892/1948, n. 5).
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6. Recanati (1993, Chapter 4) presents a detailed 
case for the broader claim that psychological 
modes of presentation generally differ from 
linguistic modes of presentation.
7. The first to have articulated a precise theory of 
this kind is probably Reichenbach (1947).
8. Hart (1970) already points out a structurally 
similar issue, arising in connection with sentences 
that refer to themselves, like the sentence S
1
 “S
1
 
is in English”. Hart observes that such self-
referential sentences give rise to this puzzling 
feature that no other self-referential sentence 
can quite reproduce their meaning. This is best 
evidenced if we try to translate S
1
 in another 
language. A distinct sentence, for instance the 
French sentence S
2
, “S
1
 est en anglais”, could also 
refer to S
1
, but would in so doing cease to be self-
referential. Yet another sentence, S
3
, “S
3
 est en 
français”, might seem like a better translation of 
S
1
 since it preserves its self-referential structure; 
but the reference to S
1
 is missing in the content 
of S
3
. S
1
 alone can carry just the meaning it 
does carry and be self-referential. This feature 
mirrors, at the higher level of abstraction of the 
sentence, the property of irreproducibility that 
token-reflexive contents have at the lower level of 
the occurrence.
9. The notation s[x] stands for the sense of a 
representation x.
10. (Perry, 1977/2000, 21).
11. The commitment to the existence of one-shot 
thoughts, we take it, is incurred by any strict 
neo-Fregean who endorses a descriptivist, token-
reflexive view of ‘I’. This is not the case of 
Evans, who doesn’t satisfy the second condition; 
but it is the case of Zemach (1972, 1985) and 
Higginbotham (2003). (By a “strict” neo-Fregean, 
we mean someone who does not just admit of the 
existence of senses, but confers on them a direct 
truth-conditional role. Perry, according to this 
criterion, does not count as a strict neo-Fregean.)
12. Throughout the argument, ‘thinking’ stands for 
one and the same attitude.
13. Say that a thought x rationally implies y if an 
ideally rational subject cannot think x without 
thinking y. The above argument can easily be 
strengthened to show that I cannot think a one-
shot thought at the same time as a thought which 
is not rationally implied by it. But I can clearly 
think simultaneously, under the same attitude, 
any two thoughts which are not contradictory, 
whether or not they are in a relation of rational 
implication; so the strengthened argument, again, 
yields a paradoxical result.
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